The Pakistan Mess  
New York Times 
November 6, 2007 
Editorial
 
By imposing martial law, Gen. Pervez Musharraf has pushed nuclear-armed Pakistan further along a perilous course and underscored the failure of President Bush’s policy toward a key ally in the war on terrorism. The events should not have come as a surprise to administration officials. This is what you get when policy is centered slavishly on a single, autocratic ruler rather than more broadly on his country.

The general, Pakistan’s president, justified his crackdown as a defense against Islamic militants, but his desperate and reprehensible actions — suspending the constitution, rounding up judges, beating and jailing lawyers and journalists — will embolden extremists. They will also fuel anger and mistrust among Pakistani moderates.
After winning a sham ballot last month, General Musharraf was awaiting a Supreme Court decision on whether his election, while still serving as army chief of staff, was legal. Jane Perlez and David Rohde reported in The Times that the dictator asserted military powers after getting word that the court would rule against him. A phone call at 2 a.m. Pakistan time from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dissuaded the general from taking similar action during last summer’s mass political protests, but this time nothing could induce him to back down.

Returning Pakistan to civilian government has been a declared goal of the United States since General Musharraf seized power in 1999 in a bloodless military coup. He has repeatedly broken promises to move in that direction, using his power vindictively and squandering popular support by forcing rivals into exile and intimidating anyone who tried to stand up to him. Most of the time, Mr. Bush, who says he cannot win the anti-terrorism war without General Musharraf but clearly can’t win it with him either, acquiesced in his misdeeds.

The Faustian nature of the bargain is more apparent than ever. Not only has the general proven less committed to the anti-terrorism fight than expected (Al Qaeda and the Taliban are resurgent on the border with Afghanistan), but now he has abandoned any pretense of moving toward democracy. Mr. Bush seems to have gained little leverage from the more than $10 billion in American aid that has fattened Pakistan’s coffers since Sept. 11, 2001, much of it unaccounted for.

It was encouraging to see Pakistani lawyers openly challenge the legitimacy of Mr. Musharraf’s emergency degree on Monday — although the response was less than heartening. General Musharraf first sent his police to beat the protesters and then announced that a national election would take place in January. At this point, what is that assurance worth?

The United States is increasingly left with bad options. Cutting off aid would only make it harder to enlist Pakistan’s military in the anti-extremist fight and renew doubts about America’s reliability as an ally. The United States should at least condition that money on Pakistan’s performance in the anti-terrorism fight, on some form of accountability and on shifting more of it toward building political parties, courts and schools. It should also consider discussions with India, Iran, China and Saudi Arabia on how to prevent further instability in Pakistan.

Ultimately, democracy, not dictatorship, is the best hope for a stable Pakistan. Reviving General Musharraf’s back-room deal with the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, however distasteful, may be a way back from the abyss if it includes a real commitment to elections by the general, if Ms. Bhutto insists that the eletions be open to all parties and if Mr. Bush gives her strong backing.

 
Musharraf's Second Coup 
Wall Street Journal 
November 6, 2007 
By Najam Sethi - Commentary
 

If Gen. Pervez Musharraf is trying to ensure the stability of Pakistan, he certainly has an odd way of going about it. His promulgation of a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) and a State of Emergency over the weekend have upset the delicate political transition needed by the country amid the return of Benazir Bhutto, and the planning for elections three months hence. To make matters worse, the subsequent arrests of largely peaceful moderate politicians, a purge of the judiciary and gagging of the press have alienated the very forces of moderation and democracy Pakistan needs most.

As a result, Pakistanis now find themselves living in the sort of repressive state they have not experienced since the 1980s, during the rule of the last full-fledged military dictator, Gen. Zia ul Haq. All private news channels were taken off the air on Saturday and new laws were unfurled to restrict fundamental rights, silence the media and impose punishments of up to three years for criticizing the military. In the last 72 hours, the regime has used its new powers under the provisional emergency to flush the Supreme Court and the high courts of all "hostile judges" and rope in pliant replacements.


In this still from state TV, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf addresses the nation after the imposition of a state of emergency, Nov. 3, 2007.
The PCO lies at the crux of this weekend's political turbulence. It is unconstitutional because it suspends part of the constitution without parliamentary approval. It lays the political system at Mr. Musharraf's mercy and whim. The contents of the emergency which follows on the basis of the PCO shed a great deal of light on why he has taken this drastic step.

In Mr. Musharraf's telling, his prime motivation is deteriorating law and order amid acts of terrorism. He has accused the judiciary of being a major culprit in log-jamming the executive and undermining the war against extremism. Out of 11 effective clauses in the proclamation of emergency, eight refer to the negative role played by the judges and the judiciary in challenging the military's use of force in the war against terrorism, the executive functioning of government and the economy. The most significant clauses in the PCO prohibit the courts from challenging the president, prime minister or anyone exercising authority on their behalf.

But the reality may be somewhat different from the law-and-order rhetoric. Mr. Musharraf was faced with a challenge to his recent re-election as president before the Supreme Court, turning on whether he could hold the post of president while still in uniform at the head of the army. Such a challenge is now disallowed under the PCO. And because Mr. Musharraf is also purging the judiciary of judges who will not swear to uphold the new constitutional order, he can be sure the courts won't complain about the new restrictions on their powers. In the last 48 hours, he has sworn in a new chief justice and a few dozen other judges, and has detained the judges who have been removed.

It is also noteworthy that under the new legal regime, Mr. Musharraf can extend the term of the various parliaments for up to a year. Their terms had been scheduled to end later this month, and general elections should have followed within three months. But thanks to the declaration of emergency, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz now says that elections can be postponed. This makes perfect political sense for Mr. Musharraf. Given widespread public resentment against him, his ruling Pakistan Muslim League had been fearful of its chances at the polls and was pressing the president to postpone them.

Ms. Bhutto has described the emergency declaration as a "mini martial law" or "second coup" by Mr. Musharraf, who first acceded to power in a coup in 1999. His presidency, which was likely to be struck down by the old Supreme Court, has been confirmed and upheld by the new PCO.

Two factors will play a critical role in determining what happens next. The first is the extent to which rights activists -- particularly lawyers -- can continue their vocal protests despite the repression. The second will be the role played by Ms. Bhutto's People's Party (PPP), which lays claim to the largest vote bank in the country.

Lawyers, civil society groups and opposition parties are gearing up to launch protests across Pakistan and to boycott the courts. These groups comprise powerful anti-American religious elements, weak moderates and liberal nongovernmental organizations. The balance of power is held by the liberal People's Party and the conservative ruling Muslim League, which consider the religious parties their natural ally. So it is profoundly troubling that with the electronic media blinded and the administration freed from accountability, Mr. Musharraf is using the police and paramilitary forces to arrest opponents, instead of clinching a power-sharing deal with Ms. Bhutto to enlarge the moderate mainstream and push back the tide of radical political Islam -- which benefits from the repression of the state.

As for Ms. Bhutto and her party, the original U.S.-brokered "deal" that enabled Ms. Bhutto's return to Pakistan from self-imposed exile last October envisaged a relatively free and early election. She was supposed to share power after the elections with Mr. Musharraf, on the assumption that a liberal civil-military coalition government would be able to better tackle the war against religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. That is in danger of shipwreck, now that Mr. Musharraf is inclined to postpone the elections, sideline the PPP and crush all resistance against his authoritarianism.

And because it is so unpopular, Mr. Musharraf's latest move puts Ms. Bhutto in a particularly tough spot. She can't afford to appear soft on Mr. Musharraf, even though the two have been preparing a power-sharing agreement. So she's put in the position, whether she wants to or not, of mustering her own newfound popularity to put him on the mat.

A day after her arrival and the suicide bomb attack on her, she accused the government of harboring people who wanted her eliminated, and pointed the finger at a retired Interservices Intelligence (ISI) brigadier who is a close friend of Mr. Musharraf and heads the Intelligence Bureau. Now, she has rejected the PCO and emergency declaration, and demanded a national consensus government to oversee the country until the general elections can go ahead in January, as originally pledged by Mr. Musharraf.

Mr. Musharraf wants Ms. Bhutto to desist from joining hands with the opposition parties and fueling the protest movement. She wants him to hold quick elections and give her a level playing field. In a sign of how much damage the weekend's events have done to the reconciliation process, the two reportedly have reverted to talking only via secret intermediaries, because she doesn't want to be seen negotiating with an unpopular military dictator, while he doesn't want his Muslim League to get nervous at further overtures to "the enemy."

The U.S., European Union and the rest of the international community have condemned the provisional constitutional order and have demanded a restoration of full-fledged democracy via free and fair general elections. But the U.S. still sees the military under Mr. Musharraf as the best bet in the war against terror.

That may turn out to be a mistake if Mr. Musharraf insists on going it alone. His appeal is fast fading. If he doesn't hold free elections quickly and agree to share power, Ms. Bhutto may be constrained to pull out of their earlier deal under public pressure. If that were to happen, the Musharraf regime would become more isolated and straitjacketed than ever. With an upsurge in anti-Americanism, religious radicalism and civil strife on the cards, the prospects of Pakistan solely under Mr. Musharraf would then become questionable.



Financial Times 
The lure of false stability in Pakistan 
November 6 2007 
By Gideon Rachman - Commentary 

 
Sometimes it can be fun to be the bearer of bad tidings. On Saturday night I was able to stroll over to a senior member of the British foreign policy establishment and tell him that a state of emergency had been declared in Pakistan. Lawyers, politicians and human rights activists were under arrest. The senior member looked suitably concerned, got out his BlackBerry, called up the news and began to read. "Oh dear," he said.

Oh dear, indeed. It is a cliché of the international relations business that "Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world". This is a nation with nuclear weapons, al-Qaeda bases, large lawless areas bordering Afghanistan and a rising tide of domestic militancy and terrorism. The US and its allies have treated General Pervez Musharraf as a crucial partner in trying to deal with these problems. But the general's latest move threatens to produce turmoil and strips away the facade of constitutionalism that made it easier for the west to support him. So the western powers have to ask whether the general is - as they say - now part of the problem, rather than part of the solution?

To judge from the American and British policymakers I spoke to at a conference over the weekend, opinion is divided. One Briton argued that: "We can't go along with this coup. If we do, there will be an even bigger explosion in 10 years' time." An American responded: "Ten years from now is better than now."

Part of the problem is that the west has limited leverage. Or rather, there are certain levers that the west is unwilling to pull. The Americans are not going to cut off relations with a Pakistani army that they are urging to fight al-Qaeda - and that has its finger on the nuclear button. The British are not going to stop talking to an intelligence service that is critical to tracking the comings and goings of would-be suicide bombers.

Beyond these pragmatic security concerns there is a deep scepticism about the chances of establishing a stable democracy in Pakistan. The country's history since independence is hardly encouraging.

A few years ago President George W. Bush declared that America would no longer rely on the "false stability" that came from supporting pro-western dictatorships. But the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan have given democracy-building a bad name. As one American commentator puts it: "That old false stability is looking pretty good right now."

All of this means that America and its allies are unlikely to withdraw support from Gen Musharraf. Instead, they will urge him to start rebuilding the facade of constitutionalism as soon as possible.

But even if the "war on terror" is regarded as the critical consideration in determining policy to Pakistan, it is no longer obvious that that means supporting the current regime.

Gen Musharraf's record on terror is distinctly mixed. It is true that terrorists have tried to murder him several times. But it is also on his watch that al-Qaeda and the Taliban have established safe havens on Pakistani soil. Suicide bombing has also spread to Pakistan.

In any case, the war on terror is not only about military and intelligence co-operation. In the long run, it must mean diminishing the rampaging anti-Americanism that serves as a recruiting sergeant for the terrorists.

Here, the news from Pakistan is really discouraging. The most recent Pew survey of global opinion showed that only 15 per cent of Pakistanis had a favourable opinion of the US. Of the more than 40 groups polled, only the Palestinians and the Turks were more hostile.

Of course, you could draw a variety of conclusions from these numbers. A truly cynical interpretation would be that if the Pakistanis really hate the US that much, the last thing you want is a democratic government to give expression to that sentiment. The trouble is that the history of the cold war demonstrates that the best way to entrench anti-Americanism for generations is for the US to support an unpopular dictatorship. And the polls show that Gen Musharraf - who once commanded quite a lot of support - is increasingly unpopular within Pakistan. His approval ratings are now in the low 20s - and that was before the declaration of a state of emergency.

Gen Musharraf would like the west to believe that the only alternatives to his continued rule are anarchy or Islamism. But the people he is locking up in this latest crackdown are not the proverbial "mad mullahs". They are lawyers, journalists and human rights activists - the backbone of the civil society that is needed if Pakistan is ever to make the transition to a sustainable democracy.

Would these people eventually be swept aside by militant Islamists - making westerners and middle-class Pakistanis swiftly yearn for a return of military rule? Again, the evidence for this is quite weak. Islamist parties have never captured above 11 per cent of the vote in Pakistan. The polls suggest that popular sympathy for terrorism is actually falling, as Pakistanis experience suicide bombing on their own soil. In 2004, 41 per cent of Pakistanis told the Pew pollsters that suicide bombing was "sometimes" justified. This year that figure is down to 9 per cent.

The fact is that terrorism is even more of a threat to Pakistan than it is to the west - and most Pakistanis know it. Any future government of the country will have to act on that knowledge - as will the Pakistani army.

Mr Musharraf is not an indispensable ally in the fight against terrorism. So it is no longer in the west's interests to encourage him to cling to power.


 
Working With a Dictator
President Bush's feeble response to Pakistan's coup mocks the 'freedom agenda.'
Washington Post 
November 6, 2007 - Editorial 

 
PAKISTANI PRESIDENT Pervez Musharraf claims that he suspended the constitution and imposed de facto martial law Saturday to save his country from Islamic extremists. But his crackdown has been directed almost entirely at Pakistan's moderate, secular and pro-democracy opposition -- the very people who could offer a political alternative to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. At least 500 lawyers, judges, political party leaders, human rights activists and journalists have been arrested. Independent television stations have been shut. Lawyers who tried to demonstrate against the repression in front of the Supreme Court yesterday were attacked by security forces.

Mr. Musharraf is waging war not against extremism but against democracy. He acted because he feared the Supreme Court was preparing to rule that his orchestrated reelection as president last month was unconstitutional. He was seeking to escape from commitments made to Pakistan's secular political leaders and to the Bush administration that he would step down as army commander by Nov. 15 and hold free and fair parliamentary elections early next year.

The choice the United States and other Western governments now face is not between Mr. Musharraf and the terrorist forces he has sporadically combated since 2001. It is between a deeply unpopular, ineffective and politically exhausted military ruler who is trying to extend his tenure by force and one of the Muslim world's largest and most liberal civil societies. President Bush has rightly said that democracy is the best antidote to the totalitarianism of Islamic extremists. Mr. Musharraf's own record is proof that autocratic governments only make extremism stronger.

There should be no question as to which side the United States is on. Yet so far the administration has hedged its bets. It has called Mr. Musharraf's measures "extreme" and said it "cannot support emergency rule." But Mr. Bush said yesterday that "we want to continue working with him" on counterterrorism, and officials have made clear that aid directed at that collaboration -- which is most of the U.S. aid Pakistan receives -- will not be affected. The general probably will regard that stance as an acquiescence to his coup -- as will most Pakistanis and the millions of other Muslims around the world who are watching the U.S. response.

The United States should explicitly and fully support Pakistan's civilian politicians and judges. Such a stance need not cause the downfall of Mr. Musharraf; he still has the option to back down, restore the constitution and schedule elections. But as things stand, if he manages to withstand the almost universal domestic opposition to his coup, the United States will be blamed for propping him up -- and for taking the wrong side in a crucial test of its seriousness about fighting extremism with democracy.


Musharraf shows dictators how it's done
 
The Pakistani president uses the Islamist boogeyman to tighten his grip on power and quell an independent judiciary.
 

Pakistan on the brink
Washington Times
November 6, 2007
Editorial

No one knows for certain where nuclear-armed Pakistan is headed. President Pervez Musharraf stepped closer toward the ledge yesterday following a "state-of-emergency" declaration by imprisoning thousands of political adversaries, sacking the supreme court and arresting lawyers and judges who refuse a loyalty oath. That follows a silencing of the media, the postponement of January elections and the imposition of a heavy police and military street presence to intimidate opponents.

In essence, Gen. Musharraf is playing his remaining strengths in a military uniform in a bid to retain power, keenly aware that his cooperation in the war on terror is indispensable.

Since Gen. Musharraf seized power in 1999, military officers' extensive presence in government and in the doling of favors have worn on the military's reputation. It is not clear how much longer the Pakistani public will countenance Islamabad's extensive politicization. Meanwhile, internationally, Gen. Musharraf clearly believes that he has called the West's bluff, and so far, there are dangerously few signs that he is wrong.

A sense of confusion in U.S. policy emerged yesterday. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice voiced her disappointment on Sunday and called for a review of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan in what seemed like a warning to Gen. Musharraf to stop the dictatorial backsliding. Yesterday, she also called for Gen. Musharraf to hold the January elections that he promised. Then, intentionally or not, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates all but declared any U.S. security review to be toothless. "Pakistan is a country of great strategic importance to the United States and a key partner in the war on terror," Mr. Gates said from China, urging a return to "law-based, constitutional and democratic rule as soon as possible." But any defense review will be "mindful to not undermine on-going counterterrorism efforts."

In reality, Gen. Musharraf has already undermined U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The groundwork was laid in decades of official encouragement of radical Islamist opinion. Under the general himself, a see-no-evil policy regarding the intelligence services' cooperation with radicals has reigned. Now, this week's "second coup" drags U.S. assistance through a new layer of mud. The general seemingly cannot distinguish between threats to his continued occupation of the executive offices and genuine threats to the security of Pakistan. Or can he?

With police tear-gassing and beating lawyers in the streets, Western diplomats must attempt to walk Gen. Musharraf back from the ledge. Unless and until a post-Musharraf path is devised, careful negotiation is the chief option for this nuclear-armed and autocratic government.


At last, a final sign of sense as Pervez Musharraf tries to put the elections back on track
 
The Times of London 
November 6, 2007 
Bronwen Maddox - Comment

Pervez Musharraf made his first sensible move for three days in suggesting that parliamentary elections might go ahead as planned in January.

That may be a sign that he is listening to the appalled reaction, at home and abroad, to his state of emergency. But Britain and the US, the countries best placed to make that case, have very few levers to pull, officials quietly acknowledge, unless they want to ditch Musharraf as President – and at this point, they don’t.

Their reflex in favour of the devil they know is justifiable provided that Musharraf brings Pakistan immediately back to the schedule for elections. But the status quo is not stable; the past three days are the unsurprising climax to the crises of the past six months.

Pakistan has often shown an impressive self-righting ability after crisis. But Musharraf’s actions are a gift to the militants and, however risky, the mantra of recent US policy appears right: democracy is the only good answer.

Yesterday Musharraf appeared to offer a half-concession, as Malik Qayyum, his Attorney-General, said that “it has been decided there would be no delay in the election”. He added that national and provincial assemblies would be dissolved by November 15 and that elections would be held within 60 days.

But this contradicted the earlier view of Shaukat Aziz, the Prime Minister, that elections were likely to be put off by a year or two. Yesterday Aziz still left room for a delay, saying that “the next general elections will be held according to the schedule or a programme that will be finalised after consultation with all the stakeholders”.

Aziz, a smooth former Citibanker, and a technocrat brought in by Musharraf to reassure investors, should win a prize for evasive vocabulary; by his ludicrous use of “stakeholder”, he cannot mean the heads of the main political parties, or the seven justices (of 11) of the Supreme Court whom Musharraf sacked on Saturday, never mind the 165 million people of Pakistan.

Musharraf, in meeting foreign ambassadors yesterday, also tried to strike a conciliatory tone. State-run television reported him as telling them: “I’m determined to remove my uniform once we correct these pillars in the judiciary and the executive and the parliament.” By “correcting the judiciary”, he seems to mean removing the majority on the Supreme Court that were likely to say this week that his carefully choreographed reelection last month was unconstitutional.

It is in character for Musharraf, after striking out inappropriately, to try to pretend that it is business as usual. But it isn’t. He has almost no support left, even in the Army, although so far, it is following his orders. He dismissed rumours that officers had put him under house arrest as “a joke of the highest order”. But if protests grow, officers may not want to suppress them; the Army is already unpopular and demoralised after killing militants in the tribal areas (and losing 1,000 men in the process). Soldiers say that they no longer like wearing uniforms in public.

Britain and the US said yesterday that they had no plans to cut back aid for fear of depriving regions desperately in need of help. In the US, however, in an election year, Congress will have plenty to say and may try to force cuts under laws curbing aid to governments that have carried out coups. In 2001 President Bush secured an exception for Pakistan on the grounds that it was helping in the War on Terror and Musharraf had promised elections. But if that prospect fades, so may US cash.

The US has also been trying quietly to strengthen ties with Afghanistan’s neighbours, partly as protection for its military supply routes if turmoil in Pakistan gets worse. Admiral William Fallon, head of US Central Command, was in Kyrgyzstan on Monday.

The US and Britain may also try to lever Nawaz Sharif, the exiled leader of the Pakistan Muslim League, one of the two big parties, back into politics. Yesterday his brother, Shahbaz, said that Nawaz, now in Saudi Arabia, hoped to return to London soon and that he might even resurrect an alliance with Benazir Bhutto, leader of the rival Pakistan People’s Party. The US and Britain can signal their approval for these steps. But their influence is slim, given that they have backed a military leader, a hot-headed one at that, and even after six months of serious misjudgments, still prefer him to the unknown.