Pakistan Muslim League
president Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain visited Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) and
conveyed to its two leaders that the Pakistani government has accepted all
of Lal Masjid’s demands, including the implementation of Sharia Law in
Pakistan. It is
another example of the Musharraf government’s inability to contain the
pro-Taliban and pro-al-Qaeda Islamist movement inside
Pakistan. While
ceding real estate to the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance through the various
‘peace accords’ that handed terrorists South Waziristan, North Waziristan
and Bajour agencies is troubling in its own right, this latest set of
concessions is more troubling still.
First, it occurs not in
the wild tribal areas that the Pakistani government exerts little control
over. Rather, this latest concession takes place right in downtown
Islamabad,
Pakistan’s capital
city.
Second, it cedes not
territory but ideological ideals to violent Islamists aligned with the
Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Ideological ground is exponentially more difficult to regain once ceded than
real estate.
In the Asia Times, More
muscle to Pakistan’s
madrassas by Kanchan
Lakshman is reprinted with permission from the South Asia Terrorism
Portal. In it, Lakshman
provides and important glimpse at the depth of Pakistan’s
radical madrassa problem.
Pakistan’s
“officially estimated 13,000 seminaries (unofficial estimates range between
15,000 and 25,000, and in some cases go as high as 40,000) in
Pakistan, with an approximate enrollment of 1.5 million students,”
has continually rejected any reforms attempted by the Pakistani government.
The United States has pressured Musharraf to address the Pakistani madrassas,
which have long been producing ideologically steeped graduates who often
find their way into Taliban
and al-Qaeda ranks.
Before being captured on
the battlefield in Afghanistan, American
John Walker Lindh had attended a Pakistani madrassa. The same resume
reference exists for Adam Gadahn (aka Azzam al-Amriki), the commonly used
American mouthpiece for
al-Qaeda’s propaganda operation.
The madrassa problem is
not new, but it may be coming to a head in
Pakistan. In recent
analysis, we have referred to the situation as The Madrassa Match and the
Pakistani Tinderbox, and the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) is at the epicenter, if
only by virtue of its proximity: The Pakistani capital city of
Islamabad.
As Kanchan
Lakshman notes, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) calculates that fully two thirds of
Pakistan’s thousands of madrassas are
under the direct control of the
Taliban’s two
primary backers.
A majority of the
extremist seminaries that preach and support militant violence follow the
Deobandi sect and are associated with the Wafaq-ul-Madaris, the main
confederacy of seminaries. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG),
“The two factions of the Deobandi political parties, JUI-Fazlur Rehman [Jamaat-e-Ulema-Islam
faction headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman] and JUI-Samiul Haq, run over 65% of
all madrassas in Pakistan.”
Rehman and Haq are widely considered to be the primary backers of the
Taliban. [Emphasis
added.]
With regard to the
Musharraf governments new concessions to the pro-Taliban Islamists of Lal
Masjid Tuesday, there was at least some potential nuance or ambiguity in PML
president Shujaat’s words when he said, “No Muslim rejects the enforcement
of the Islamic system in the country.” There perhaps may be at least some
room there to suggest a potential difference between the government’s
interpretation and application of Sharia Law and that expected by the
Islamists. Still, however, even this would only forestall the conflict that
the Islamists appear to be itching for. It would not avert it.
More telling regardless,
DAWN reported that Shujaat toured Lal Masjid’s female madrassa, Jamia Hafsa,
where 3,000 female ‘students’ have barricaded themselves, and “denied the
presence of activists of banned outfits and illegal arms in the mosque.” The
MNL president also “said that female students were studying in a good
atmosphere.” These are the same 3,000 girls and women (and mosque leaders)
who proclaimed they were prepared for martyrdom through suicide bombings
against the Musharraf government and “un-Islamic” vendors in Pakistan.
And the thousands of
madrassas in Pakistan
continue daily to pump out ‘graduates’ steeped in radical militant Islamist
teachings and jihad. The Musharraf government does not attempt to paint a
rosier picture of the madrassa situation, unlike its false proclamations of
the Taliban driving
foreign al-Qaeda
fighters from Pakistani tribal areas.
The government’s
madrassa approach has been one of silence borne of a perceived inability to
address it directly. This perceived helplessness in the face of pervasive
indigenous radicalism drove the decision to cave to the Lal Masjid
Islamists’ demands, including the application of Sharia Law throughout
Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Hamid Gul and
Usama bin Laden bide
their time patiently. Musharraf’s caving to the pro-Taliban and pro-al-Qaeda
Lal Masjid Islamists is but another cut in their ‘Death By a Thousand Cuts’
strategy. And patiently they will wait until the time is right for the final
cut, which will almost certainly be a swift and violent insurgency initiated
by a Madrassa Match in the Pakistani Tinderbox.
